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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD E. LOWE and
BEVERLY LOWE

]
]

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

]
]i

KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and
]
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba
]
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION,])

Case No. 940388-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendants and Appellees. ]

Appellants, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure, move

this Court

for

a rehearing

on the

issues decided in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC FINDINGS
RELATING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT.
Appellants contend that the trial court failed to make the
necessary
between

findings with regard to the existence of a contract
the

Plaintiffs

and

the

Defendants

(See Appellants'

original brief at 16-24, Appellants' reply brief at 2-9).

The

Court, in its Memorandum Decision dated May 11, 1995, failed to
address the major issue raised by the Appellants.
A. The Trial Court must make Findings as to Whether or not
the Contract is Integrated and Unambiguous.
The Appellants contend that the trial court in this case
failed to make the necessary findings with regard to the written
and oral contracts entered into by the parties (Appellants' brief
at 2-10, Appellants' reply brief at 2-9).

The facts of this case reveal that the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants Golightly entered into a Sales Agreement on September
9, 1988.

Under the terms of the Sales Agreement, the Plaintiffs

were to furnish the site and the Defendants Golightly agreed to
construct,
3. . . . Said residence and improvements and provide
and furnish all labor and materials required for such
construction and the completion thereof strictly
in accordance with the plans and specifications
approved and signed . . . The work to be done by the
contractor shall include, but shall not be limited to,
all excavating, rough grading, concrete work, masonry,
lumber, carpentry, interior trim, labor, sheet rock,
pile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal
work, . . . All complete as specified in the plans and
specifications.
4. The owner, for and in consideration of the full,
complete and faithful performance of this agreement
by the contractor and his payment of all bills
incurred in the construction, agrees to pay or cause
to be paid to the contractor the sum of $117,100.00
5. No changes in the plans or specifications shall be
made by the contractor without the written order of the
owner . . . The amount to be paid by the owner or
allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall
be stated in such order . . . .
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5, Addendum No. 1 to Appellants' original
brief.
The parties signed a Building Loan Agreement and Assignment
of Account

that

included

Deseret

Bank

on

September

(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, Addendum No. 2 ) .

21, 1988

Section one of the

document required the contractor to commence construction within
thirty

days

of

the

date

of

the

Agreement

and

to

complete

construction within six months of the date of the Agreement.
2

Section five of the Agreement allowed the contractor to take
draws equal to the value of the labor and materials actually
incorporated in the improvements.
Despite the fact that the contract between the parties
clearly stated that "no changes . . . shall be made . . . without
the written order of the owner . . . , " the trial court allowed
extensive testimony regarding contemporaneous oral statements and
oral modifications of the contract, over the objection of
Plaintiffs1

counsel (Appellants1 brief at 16-29, Appellants'

reply brief at 2-17).
The mandatory duty of the trial court was recently restated
by the Utah Supreme Court in Hall v. Process Instruments and
Control, Inc., 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1995).

In that case,

the plaintiff was attempting to introduce parol evidence to
establish that her employment agreement was not integrated or was
ambiguous.

Obviously, it is the Defendants in this case that

are contending that the written agreements between the parties
are not integrated and therefore that the introduction of parol
evidence is proper.

In explaining the duty of the trial court,

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
This court has noted that as a principle of
contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a
very narrow application. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985).
Simply stated, the rule
operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating
causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, representations, or statements offered
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract.
Id. (citing Eie v. St.
Benedicts's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 1981); See
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 213-14 (1981).
Under this general rule, "an apparently complete and
3

certain writing will be conclusively presumed to
contain the whole agreement."
Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194.
Thus, before considering the applicability of the parol
evidence rule in a contact dispute, the court must
first determine that the parties intended the writing
to be an integration.
To resolve this question of
fact, any relevant evidence is admissible. Union Bank,
707 P.2d at 665 (citing Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194).
Once a court determines that an agreement is
integrated, parol evidence, although not admissible to
vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of
the contract, is admissible to clarify ambiguous terms.
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d
438, 487 (Utah 1986).
The application of the parol
evidence rule therefore involves two steps.
First,
the court must determine whether the agreement is
integrated. If the court finds the agreement is
integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if
the court makes a subsequent determination that the
language of the agreement is ambiguous.
Id. at 24.
In the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the trial court absolutely failed to make any findings as to
whether or not the written agreements signed by the parties were
integrated and/or ambiguous (Exhibit No. 6 to Appellants' brief,
R. 428-441).

The language used by the Utah Supreme Court in

Hall, supra,, is not discretionary.

The trial court must make

findings with regard to integration and ambiguity.
This
"extrinsic
contract"
admissible

Court,

in

evidence

its Memorandum
of

subsequent

is admissible.
to

Decision

indicates

modifications

to a written

In other words, parol

show oral modifications

of

that

evidence

a written

is

contract

(Memorandum Decision at 2 ) .
However,

even

if

parol

evidence

regarding

subsequent

agreements is admissible, the trial court must make findings that
4

a subsequent contract, with all of the requisite elements, has
been made between the parties.

Accordingly, even if this Court

finds that some of the parol evidence was admissible to establish
the existence of a subsequent oral agreement, the Findings of the
trial court in this case are deficient in that the court never
extrapolates the terms of specific subsequent oral agreements
from the evidence.

The failure to enter adequate findings of

fact on material issues is reversible error.

The findings must

be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the
ultimate conclusion can be understood.
Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
The appellate court can

only grant a trial court's decision the usual deference when the
findings are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary
basis for the court's decision.

Woodward v. Fazzio, 175 Utah

Adv. Rep. 70 (Utah Ct. of App. 1991).
B.

The Trial Court's Findings are Clearly Insufficient
and Mandate Reversal.

Under the terms of the Sales Agreement dated September 9,
1988,

the Defendants assumed the obligation to complete, in

accordance with the plans and specifications approved and signed,
all excavating, rough grating, concrete work, masonry, lumber,
carpentry, interior trim, labor, sheet rock, pile and/or linoleum
work, iron work and sheet metal work (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5,
Addendum No. 1 to Appellants' original brief).

The testimony

further clearly established that only four signed change orders
were signed by the Plaintiffs (Appellants' brief at 8).

The

Defendants clearly extended monies far in excess of the contract
5

amount (Appellants' brief at 9-10), and there were a large number
of irregularities in the construction of the home (Appellants'
brief at 11-12).
With the factual background set out above, the findings and
conclusions of the trial court are clearly inadequate.
In Findings numbered 3 and 4, the trial court notes the
11

significant

disagreement

"contradictions"
sides.
the

between

between

the evidence

the

parties"

offered

and

the

by the various

Although the court notes the disparity in the testimony,

court makes

credible

and/or

no

findings

believable.

as to which
These

testimony

findings

be

alone,

found

without

identifying the testimony that the trial court did not believe,
are useless in understanding what the trial court ruled and the
basis of that ruling (R. 440).
In Finding number 6, the trial court referred to changes in
the contract that were discussed between Clay (the Plaintiffs'
son and the Defendants' foreman) and the Plaintiffs.

The trial

court

made

then

stated

that

"these

changes

would

be

and

incorporated as a result of these conversations . . ." (R. 439).
The Findings of the trial court fail to identify what changes
were

discussed

Defendants.

and

agreed

upon

by

the

Plaintiffs

and

the

The trial court's simple reference to the fact that

agreements subsequent to the original contract were made does not
answer the critical question of what change or changes the court
is referring to and the evidentiary basis the court is using to
substantiate a finding of a subsequent agreement.

6

Finding number 7 is another confusing paragraph.

The trial

court notes the existence of conflicting testimony as to whether
the construction

plans were properly

drawn.

The court then

stated:
As the project was being completed and changes
were requested, most of the requested changes were
not reflected on the plans even though the Plaintiffs
acknowledged requesting or consenting to changes.
R. at 439.

The Finding is deficient in that it fails to identify

which of the many contested changes and irregularities, the court
found

were

to

be

included

within

the

scheme

of

subsequent

agreements of factual situations outlined in Finding number 7.
The Finding is further insufficient in that it fails to point to
any

evidence

wherein

modification.

the parties

Thus,

after

agreed

reading

to proceed

Finding

by

number

oral

7,

the

litigants do not know what issues were meant to be included in
paragraph 7 and the evidentiary basis upon which the Finding was
made.
In Finding number 8, the court refers to the fact that the
Plaintiffs

maintained

control

over

certain

areas

of

the

construction.

The court noted that "the Defendants did not have

control

these

over

responsible

for

areas

them."

as

the

The

Plaintiffs

question

desired

is, what

to

does

"Plaintiffs' desire" have to do with the issues in the case.
order

for the written contract of the parties, which

be
the
In

assigns

specific responsibility, to be replaced, the court had to make
findings of a subsequent oral agreement.
insufficient

The Finding is totally

to establish the existence of a subsequent

7

oral

agreement and/or any impossibility of the Defendants to perform
in accordance with the contract.

Further, the Finding fails to

relate to any claim of the Plaintiff.
fails to

find

that particular

For instance, the court

costs or expenses were

excused by the Plaintiffs' assertion of control.

to be

The Finding

fails to specify any specific dollar amounts attributable to the
conduct (R. at 438).
Finding number 9 indicates that the sub-contractors hired by
the Plaintiff exceeded allowable amounts but failed to make any
finding as to the dollar amounts and therefore, the impact on the
Plaintiffsf claim.
In Finding number 15, the trial court explicitly found that
the Defendants' failed to construct the residence in accordance
with the original plans and specifications.

The court then found

that:
The plans and specifications were changed by the
parties many times by both writing and verbal
understanding.
R. at 436.

Again, the trial court fails to list even one change

that it found to have been orally made by the parties.
impossible

It is

for the Appellants to argue the sufficiency of the

court's evidentiary finding when the trial court fails to list
the issue and the terms of the oral modification.
oral

modification

conduct

may

Even if an

to the contract was made, the Defendants'

have breached

that oral modification.

However,

without even a vague reference to the issue and the terms of the
modified agreement, the Appellants have no basis upon which to

8

argue the sufficiency of the evidence or the legal sufficiency of
the finding.
In summary, the trial court failed to make any findings as
to whether or not the two written agreements of the parties were
intended to represent an integrated contract.

The court made no

finding as to whether any of the terms in written agreements were
ambiguous.
Recognizing that this Court, in its Memorandum Decision
acknowledged the admissibility of parol evidence to establish
subsequent agreements, the findings of the trial court are still
insufficient.

The court failed to specifically find the terms of

any subsequent

agreement.

The trial court's reference to

subsequent agreements failed to mention any specific issues and
further failed to identify the terms of the subsequent agreement,
upon which the parties conduct could be gauged by this Court.

In

essence, the Appellants are required to speculate and this Court
is required to guess what contracts the court found to have
existed and the terms of those contracts.

Both the Appellants

and this Court must speculate as to how those agreements shaped
the specific claims raised by the Plaintiffs.
appropriate.

An example is

The trial court could certainly find that the

parties written agreement with regard to responsibility for
excavation had been changed by a subsequent oral agreement.
However, the court should define specifically the terms of that
subsequent agreement.
entire

responsibility

The parties could have agreed that the
for

excavation
9

was changed

to the

Plaintiffs or could have found that only a small item regarding
excavation was to be channeled to the Plaintiffs.

Only when the

terms of the subsequent

by the trial

agreement

are described

court, can the parties conduct be measured against the terms of
the agreement.

If the trial court fails to divulge its findings

with regard to the elements of the subsequent agreement, there is
no basis upon which to gauge the parties conduct or review the
trial court's propriety in making the evidentiary finding.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court's finding that
parol

evidence

written

is admissible

contract

and

that

to show oral modification of a

the

parol

evidence

was

properly

admitted by the trial court, is not dispositive of the issues
raised

by the Appellants.

The case

law is clear that

after

hearing the extrinsic evidence, the trial court had an obligation
to enter findings as to the elements of the contract it found to
exist.

If the trial court found subsequent modifications of that

contract, the trial court was obligated to detail the terms of
the

subsequent

agreements

and how the conduct of the

compared to their contractual obligations.

parties

The trial court in

this case simply failed to identify what contract or contracts
were entered into by the parties.

The court failed to make any

findings as to integration or ambiguity.
the unspecified
trial

court

contract

were

contract

failed

to

and how

Although finding that

or contracts had been modified,

state

what

the parties

regard to the amended agreements.
10

the

terms of

conducted

the

the

amended

themselves

with

The findings are insufficient

to meet the test of Rule 52(a) of finding the facts "specially
and [stating] separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ."
The trial court's decision must be reversed based upon the clear
mandate of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. and the interpreting case law.
POINT II: THE APPELLANTS MET THEIR OBLIGATION WITH
REGARD TO MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE AND DEMONSTRATING
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
The

Appellants

contended

that

the

properly

marshalled

evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings
(Appellants1 brief at 29-38, Appellants reply brief at 18-22).
In ruling on the Plaintiffs' claim, this Court stated that:
Although Plaintiffs acknowledge their duty to
marshall the evidence when challenging the trial
court's findings, Plaintiffs advance the novel concept
that because they believe the evidence supporting the
findings to be inadmissible parol evidence, they are
relieved from the burden of marshalling the evidence.
However, Plaintiffs have failed to support their
i n n o v a t i v e t h e o r y w i t h s u p p o r t i n g case law.
Therefore, because we find that the evidence was
properly admitted, Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill
their marshalling duty and, on this basis, we decline
to reach this issue.
Id. at 2-3.
The Plaintiffs' "novel concept" has been repeatedly used by
the Utah Appellate Courts.

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ."
importance

of

adequate

findings of

stressed by the Appellate Courts.
Rep. 28, 30 (Utah App. 1991).

fact has been

The

continually

State v. Vigil, 164 Utah Adv.

This Court has repeatedly stated
11

that:
. . . if we are to determine whether the evidence
adduced at trial supports the trial court's findings,
the findings must embody sufficient detail and include
enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence
upon which they are grounded, (Emphasis added.)
Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 71.

See also Acton v. Deliran, 737

P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d

953, 957

(Utah 1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
As noted
1990),

in State v. Lovegren, 798 P. 2d 767, 771

the

virtually

absence

of

impossible

adequate

to

conduct

findings

of

a meaningful

fact

(Utah App.
makes

review

it

of

the

that

the

decision's evidentiary basis.
In

Woodward,

supra,

the

appellee

contended

appellant, Fazzio had failed to properly marshal the evidence.
In response, this Court stated:
Fazzio, in his brief and at oral argument,
characterized his appeal as a challenge to the trial
court's factual findings. Accordingly, he attempted to
marshal the evidence, as is required for such a
challenge. See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191
(Utah 1987).
However, the marshaling effort was
largely ineffectual by reason of the conclusory nature
of the trial court's findings of fact.
"The process of marshaling the evidence serves the
important function of reminding litigants and
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the
fact finder at trial."
State v. Moore, 802 P. 2d 732
(Utah App. 1990).
However, we will only grant this
difference when the findings of fact are sufficiently
detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the
court's decision. See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial
court decision afforded no deference when findings
inadequate). See also Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108
(Utah App. 1990) (failure to enter detailed findings
concerning child support determination constitutes
abuse of trial court' discretion).
There is, in
effect, no need of an appellant to marshal the evidence
12

when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully Challenged as factual determinations. In
other words, the way to attack findings which appear
to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is
to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate
the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings.
But where the findings are not of that caliber,
appellant need not go through a futile marshaling
exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal
insufficiency of the court's findings as framed.
Id. at 71-72.
As in Woodward, supra, the Appellants did the best they
could in marshaling the evidence (Appellants' brief at 29-36,
Appellants' reply brief at 18-22).
fails to make definitive

However, when the trial court

findings as to what contract or

contracts, he finds valid, it is impossible to fully demonstrate
the insufficiency of the evidence.

Further, when the trial court

makes a general finding that oral modifications of a contract
were made and fails to identify the subject matter of the
amendment, the terms of the amended contract and how the parties
conducted themselves with regard to the amended contract, it is
impossible to marshal the evidence.
It is clear that the trial court failed to define the terms
of the original contract, the terms of any amendments and
specifically failed to identify how the parties complied or
failed to comply with the terms of those agreements.

Totally

absent from the trial court's findings is any reference to
specific

dollar

amounts

as it relates to the claims and

counterclaims of the parties.
With
reasonable

that

background,

under

the

the Appellants

circumstances
13

to

did

everything

demonstrating

the

insufficiency of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed fundamental error with regard to
its evidentiary rulings that marred the proper resolution of this
case.

The trial court failed to make any specific findings with

regard to whether the Sales Agreement and Building Agreement were
integrated

and

unambiguous.

Accordingly,

all

of

the

parol

evidence relating to contemporaneous discussions of the parties
was improperly admitted.
Although
subsequent

this

Court

agreements

is

ruled

that

admissible,

extrinsic
that

evidence

finding

does

of
not

compensate for the clear inadequacy of the trial court's findings
in this case.

Although the trial court ruled that there were

subsequent oral agreements between the parties, the court failed
to enter any findings as to what the original agreement between
the parties was and how the amended oral agreement modified the
terms of the original contract.
the trial
matter

court

of

the

failed

With only one or two exceptions,

to even divulge

purported

subsequent

the

oral

specific

agreement

subject
(walls,

windows, excavation or the like), let alone the specific terms of
the subsequent oral agreement.
The

trial

court

failed

to specifically

describe how the

parties acted with regard to their duties under the terms of the
original

and

amended

contracts.

The

trial

court

failed

to

describe how the Plaintiffs and/or Defendants complied with or
breached the terms of the various agreements.
14

The trial court

then failed to make any specific monetary finding as to the
specific claims made by the Plaintiffs as to each of the items
included in the written contract.
It is respectfully submitted that even if parol evidence
regarding subsequent oral agreements is admissible, such a
holding by this Court does not adjudicate or resolve the issues
relating to the inadequacy of the court's findings.
The Plaintiffs' theory throughout this appeal has been that
the inadequacy of the findings prevented the proper marshaling of
the evidence to establish the insufficiency thereof.

After all,

if the trial court fails to reveal what contracts it finds
binding and fails to describe how the parties failed to comply or
breach the agreements and the resulting damages, how can an
appellant be required to marshal evidence in support of nonspecific

findings.

The findings in this case are clearly

deficient and prevent an evidentiary analysis.
Based upon this Court's failure to decide the issue of the
inadequacy of the court's findings and the failure to evaluate
the impossibility of properly marshaling the evidence based upon
non-specific

findings, the Petition for Rehearing should be

granted and the Decision of the lower court reversed.
DATED this

day of May, 1995.

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellants
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